Thanks to the genius of CQ reader Harrison Colter, I now have searchable PDFs of the Phase II reports. The new copies have already paid dividends. In the overall report on pre-war intel accuracy, two of the conclusions of the report seem to have gotten lost in the mainstream media coverage. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has concluded that Saddam Hussein maintained his stocks of biological material intended to create weapons as well as missiles banned by the cease-fire in 1991. In fact, as the report states, Saddam never accepted the missile-range restrictions and intentionally developed missiles to violate them.

These conclusions, numbers 4 and 8, appear on pages 54 through 58:

Although Iraq no longer had a large scale BW production capability after 1996, Iraq did retain an inherent dual-use BW capability. Iraq retained technical B W know-how through scientists who were involved in the pre- 199 1 B W program, as well as civilian facilities and equipment that could be bent to a BW purpose. Iraq also retained some BW-related seed stocks until after Operation Iraqi Freedom; and conducted BW-applicable research after 1996, but the ISG judged that the research was not conducted for the purposes of a BW program.

The ISG assessed that Iraq could have re-established an “elementary” BW program within a few weeks to months, but would have faced great difficulty in re-establishing an effective BW agent production capability. In addition, the ISG found no evidence that Iraq had plans after 1996 for a new BW program or was conducting BW-specific work for military purposes. The ISG found undeclared covert laboratories used by the Iraqi Intelligence Service for research in BW agents until the mid-l 990s. While uncertain of the laboratories’ purpose, the ISG noted that the work probably included development of poisons for assassination. The ISG found no “conclusive links” between these labs and a BW effort despite speculation and rumor of a possible BW role. Thus, while the Intelligence Community correctly identified many Iraqi dual-use BW capabilities, it incorrectly judged that they represented an active BW program.

This points out one of the difficult aspects of intelligence work, especially when dealing with a police state like Saddam's Iraq. Intel agencies have to take all of the information they have and then analyze it against all of the possible scenarios. Before 9/11 and before any indication that we faced an enemy determined to kill us through terrorism on a massive scale, the context of the analysis concerned whether Iraq on its own could present a threat to American security. Even if they had biological weapons, in a pre-9/11 world, we would have assumed that they had no means to deploy them against us. However, after 9/11, we had to assume that biologicals could get deployed against us clandestinely -- and Saddam had openly supported terrorist groups throughout the 1990s. If he had these weapons, he had the means to deliver them.

This is the critical point that gets lost when people talk about false and/or misleading intelligence. They forget that intelligence estimates are never, ever like courtroom indictments. They are, at best, educated estimates of enemy capability and intent. While misreading worst-case scenarios can cause policy errors, ignoring threats until a courtroom threshold of proof comes along causes 9/11, the USS Cole, and two bombed embassies in Africa.

In the case of Saddam's missiles, which certainly had the capability to threaten American forces and our allies, the pre-war intelligence proved mostly correct:

Postwar findings of the ISG confirm the Intelligence Community’s assessment that Iraq developed the Al Samud II and Al Fat’h (formerly Ababil- 100) missiles with procurements prohibited by UN sanctions, or subject to UN verification, and the missile ranges exceeded 150&m, in violation of UN prohibitions. The ISG found numerous instances where Iraq disregarded UN prohibitions and sought to improve its missile capabilities. The ISG found that Saddam did not consider ballistic missiles to be WMD and he never accepted the missile range restrictions imposed by the UN, although in late February 2003, he ultimately acquiesced to UN demands that the Al Samud II inventory be destroyed. Additionally, flight test data recovered by the ISG confirm that both the Al Samud II and the Al Fat’h had ranges in excess of 150~km. These findings support the Intelligence Community’s assessment that Iraq was developing and testing SRBMs which were capable of flying beyond the UN-administered 150~km range limit. The ISG’s interviews, site visits, and exploitation of documents indicate that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its Scud-type ballistic missiles in 1991. One Iraqi document, which had never been provided to the UN, showed the disposition, by serial number, of all 819 Scud missiles imported from Russia.

This shows rather clearly that Saddam continually and purposefully violated the missile restrictions of the cease-fire and the UN resolutions. These missiles on their own would have caused havoc in the region. However, combined with the biological efforts that the CIA and other intel services reported, they created a serious WMD threat. Even before 9/11, the US had over 40,000 military personnel in the region enforcing the sanctions on Iraq that our allies busily undermined, all of whom were deployed in areas where these missiles could have reached.

I'll continue to plow through these documents, but we can already see that the mainstream media has missed some significant details in its zeal to publish whatever will cause the greatest controversy.

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